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Abstract
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept
since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core
is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of
general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of the game among groups
rather than among individuals. In particular, the k-additive core proposed by
Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which
distributes among coalitions of size at most k, and is never empty for k ≥ 2. The
extended core of Bejan and Gomez can also be viewed as a general solution, since
it implies to give an amount to the grand coalition. The k-additive core being an
unbounded set and therefore difficult to use in practice, we propose a subset of it
called the minimal negotiation set. The idea is to select elements of the k-additive
core mimimizing the total amount given to coalitions of size greater than 1. Thus
the minimum negotiation set naturally reduces to the core for balanced games. We
study this set, giving properties and axiomatizations, as well as its relation to the
extended core of Bejan and Gomez. We give a method of computing the minimum
bargaining set, and lastly indicate how to eventually get classical solutions from
general ones.
Keywords: cooperative game, core, balancedness, general solution
1 Introduction
One of the major challenges of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility
is to propose an allocation of gains obtained by a set N of players. Typically, this
distribution (called a solution) is done among the individual players, and many concepts of
solutions have been proposed so far, the core being one of the best known solution since it
ensures coalitional rationality. However, in many real situations, the distributions of gains
is not done to individuals but often to groups of individuals (associations, companies,
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families, etc.), which can further distribute among their members according to their own
rules, which can differ from one group to another. Also, the drawbacks of the classical
solutions like the core are well known. For example, the core is often empty, which obliges
to take other solution concepts, often violating coalitional rationality.
A natural generalization of the classical view of solutions should be then to distribute
among groups rather than among individuals. We call this a general solution, and observe
that we can already find in the literature two attempts in this direction. The first one is
the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda [8, 10], which was also proposed
earlier by Vassil’ev [14] in a publication in Russian. The extended core of Bejan and
Gomez [2] can also be viewed as a general solution1, since it implies to give an amount
to the grand coalition. In the k-additive core, the distribution of v(N) is done among
coalitions of size at most k, and coalitional rationality is ensured (thus, the 1-additive core
is the classical core). In the G-extended core, the distribution is done among individuals
and the grand coalition. When the core is empty, these two general solutions allocate
some negative amounts (debts) to some coalitions (the grand coalition in the case of the
G-extended core).
The aim of this paper is to propose a subset of solutions of the k-additive core, and
to relate it to the G-extended core. Indeed, if the k-additive core has some remarkable
features (it is never empty as soon as k ≥ 2, and it preserves coalitional rationality), its
main drawback is that it is an unbounded set for any k ≥ 2. We call the subset of the
k-additive core we propose the minimum negotiation set, since it is based on the following
idea: the less negotiation is necessary, the better the solution. Indeed, a general solution
obliges individuals belonging to a group which has received an allocation to bargain among
them in order to share the amount received by the group (often a negative amount, if the
core is empty). Therefore, it is desirable to focus on solutions minimizing the number of
groups and the allocation given to them. This is achieved by minimizing a norm of the
vector of allocations to groups. We will show that the minimum negotiation set coincides
with the core when the latter is nonempty, it is a singleton for all Lp norms with p > 1,
and for the L1 norm, the payments given to individuals are exactly those produced by
the G-extended core.
An important feature of general solutions is that they do not define a payment to
individuals like classical solutions. Hence, strictly speaking they are not solutions to the
game, but rather pre-solutions, which need an additional step where payments given to
coalitions (in fact, as we have shown, these are most often debts) have to be further
redistributed among the members of these coalitions. The question is then: What do
we (l)earn from general solutions if eventually they collapse to classical solutions? A
short answer to this question would be that doing so, we main attain solutions which
could have never been reached by classical mechanisms. A more refined answer is that by
this two-step procedure, we control the result by imposing appropriate rationales at each
step. For example, using the k-additive core or subsets of it, we guarantee coalitional
rationality in the first step. In the second step, we can choose for each coalition in debt
an appropriate sharing rule (and then we get an element of the selectope [4]) or, more
generally, considering this as a bankruptcy problem [13], we can choose an appropriate
division rule. Other methods can be used as well, like bargaining procedures. The
1Although in its formulation it is not. We call it G-extended core when rewritten as a general solution.
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main aim of the paper is not to develop this second step, which should deserve a whole
study, but to focus on the first one and to study properties of general solutions and their
relationship. However, we have devoted a section to the second step giving the main
ideas.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept of general solution
and the basic material which is needed. In particular, we present properties for general
solutions, and we introduce the k-additive core and the G-extended core. Section 3 fo-
cusses on the main achievement of the paper, the minimum negotiation set. It studies
its properties, and two particular cases of norms (L1 and Lp for p > 1), and gives axiom-
atizations. Also, the notion of autonomous coalition is introduced, as well as a method
to find them. Section 4 addresses the problem of computing the minimum negotiation
set, and lastly we give a brief account on how to derive a classical payoff vector from a
general one in Section 5, and finishes the paper with concluding remarks.
2 General payoff vectors and solutions
2.1 Basic definitions and notations
We start by fixing the notation and introducing basic definitions. Let N = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N
be a finite and nonempty set of agents or players. Coalitions of players are subsets of N ,
denoted by capital letters S, T , and so on. Whenever possible, we will omit braces for
singletons and pairs, denoting {i}, {i, j} by i, ij respectively, in order to avoid a heavy
notation. A transferable utility (TU) game on N is a pair (N, v) where v is a mapping
v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0. We will denote by G(N) the set of all games over N .
For any coalition S, v(S) represents the worth of S, i.e., what coalition S could earn
regardless of other players.
To every game v ∈ G(N) we associate its Mo¨bius transform [12] (also known as
Harsanyi dividends [9]) mv : 2N → R, defined by
mv(S) :=
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ), ∀S ⊆ N, (1)
and mv(∅) = 0. Conversely, v can be recovered from mv by the inverse transform
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
mv(T ), ∀S ⊆ N. (2)
Hence the Mo¨bius transform is a linear bijection on G(N). Note in particular that
mv({i}) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N , implying that mv(S) = 0 if |S| > 1 whenever v is
additive. We recall also that the Mo¨bius transform gives the coordinates of a game into
the (2n−1)-dimensional basis of unanimity games {uS}S⊆N,S 6=∅, with uS(T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S,
and 0 otherwise.
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ Rn that assigns agent i the payoff xi. Given x ∈ Rn,
and S ⊆ N , denote by x(S) the sum ∑
i∈S
xi with the convention that x(∅) = 0. A payoff
vector is efficient for game v if x(N) = v(N). We will call preimputation of v each
efficient payoff vector of v and we denote by PI(v) the set of preimputations of v.
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Coalition S is able to improve upon payoff x if x(S) < v(S). The core C(v) of a game
v is the set of efficient payoffs that cannot be improved upon by any coalition, i.e.,
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn | ∀S ( N, x(S) ≥ v(S), and x(N) = v(N)}.
A game with a nonempty core is said to be balanced. Whenever convenient, we consider
the core as a correspondence C : G(N)⇒ Rn.
A general payoff vector is a vector x ∈ R2N\∅ that assigns to a coalition S ⊆ N a payoff
xS. Also, 1S with S ⊆ N indicates the vector with coordinate 1 for S and 0 otherwise.
The notion of efficiency easily generalizes: as for the classical case, the sum of payoffs
given to all coalitions should be equal to the total available amount, that is, v(N).
Formally, a general payoff vector is said to be efficient for v if
∑
∅6=S⊆N
xS = v(N).
Example 1. A payoff vector x ∈ Rn defines a general payoff vector by considering x(S)
for all nonempty S ⊆ N . Hence, any element of the core induces a general efficient payoff
vector.
Example 2. A less trivial example of general payoff vector, which will be central in our
study, is the Mo¨bius transform mv of a game v. Note that by (2) mv is efficient for v.
A solution on the set of games G(N) is a correspondence σ : G(N) ⇒ Rn, i.e., it
assigns to any game v ∈ G(N) a set of payoff vectors, with the additional property that
they are all efficient for v. Analogously, a general solution assigns to every game v in
G(N) a set of general payoff vectors efficient for v.
The core is a well-known solution for games. A trivial example of general solution
is the Mo¨bius transform m (see Example 2). Although the notion of general solution
is not explicitely considered in the literature, there are two recent remarkable examples
of general solutions. The first one is the k-additive core [10], where a payoff is given to
each coalition of size at most k, while the second example is the extended core [2], which
can be viewed as a general solution. In the extended core, apart from giving a payoff to
each player, a payoff is also (virtually) given to the grand coalition N . We will study
this concept in Section 2.4. Our paper mainly focusses on the k-additive core, which is
presented in Section 2.3. Before that, we introduce some properties for general solutions.
2.2 Properties of general solutions
We propose several properties for general solutions, some of them being direct general-
ization of classical properties of solutions. Let σ be a general solution on G(N). We say
that σ
• is covariant under strategic equivalence (COV) if ∀v ∈ G(N),∀α > 0, for all additive
game β:
σ(αv + β) = ασ(v) +mβ.
• is an idempotent solution (IDEM) if
σ(m−1 ◦ σ) = σ.
The property means that applying the same solution concept to the set of solutions
found (after transforming them into games by m−1) does not give more solutions.
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• is symmetric (SYM) if ∀v ∈ G(N), for all permutations pi on N such that v(pi(S)) =
v(S) holds for all S ⊆ N :
(σ(v))pi(S) = (σ(v))S, ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N,
where pi(S) = {pi(i), i ∈ S}. The property says that if a permutation leaves the
game invariant (e.g., i and j can be permuted), then the same permutation leaves
the general payoff vectors in the solution invariant too (e.g., S ∪ i and S ∪ j receive
the same payoff for all S 63 i, j).
• is coalitionally rational (CR) if ∀v ∈ G(N), ∀S ⊆ N , ∀x ∈ σ(v),∑
T⊆S
xT ≥ v(S).
As in the case of efficiency, this is a direct extension of the classical definition.
Indeed, the total amount given to coalition S (that is, to all its individuals and all
subcoalitions) is precisely ∑T⊆S xT , which should be at least equal to the worth
that S can achieve by itself, that is, v(S).
• gives a preimputation (PI) if ∀v ∈ G(N), ∀S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2 we have:
∀x ∈ σ(v), xS = 0.
Only classical solutions, like the core or the Shapley value, satisfy (PI).
• satisfies the dummy player property (DPP) if for any dummy player i, we have:
∀x ∈ σ(v), xi = v(i),
where as usual a player i is dummy if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for every S ⊆ N \ i.
• is a minimization of the global debt (MGD) if for all nonnegative games v, for all
x ∈ σ(v), ∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
min(xS, 0) = −t¯(v),
where t¯(v) = min{t ≥ 0 | C(vt) 6= ∅}, with vt the game defined by vt(N) = v(N)+t,
and vt(S) = v(S) otherwise (see Section 2.4).
This axiom can be explained as follows. By definition, t¯(v) is the minimal amount
given to the grand coalition so that coalitional rationality with classical payoff
vectors is ensured. However, the players in N are in debt of the amount t¯(v). In
terms of general payoff vectors, this means that N has to pay the debt, or more
generally, it can be spread among coalitions. The axiom says that the total debt
should not exceed the minimal amount t¯(v), and since it cannot be less without
losing coalitional rationality2, equality follows.
2This will be seen as a consequence of Proposition 3 (iv) with k = n.
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The set of general solutions is a partially ordered set with the relation 4 defined by:
σ1 4 σ2 ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ G(N), σ1(v) ⊆ σ2(v).
For any set A of general solutions, whenever it exists we denote by >(A) the top element
of A for the relation 4, that is, the element satisfying σ 4 >(A) for all σ ∈ A.
For example, if we denote by PICR the set of general solutions which satisfy (PI)
and (CR), then
C = >(PICR).
2.3 The k-additive core
A game v ∈ G(N) is said to be k-additive [6] if its Mo¨bius transform mv vanishes for
subsets of more than k players: mv(S) = 0 if |S| > k, and there exists K ⊆ N , |K| = k,
such that mv(K) 6= 0. Note that a 1-additive game is an additive game in the usual sense.
A game v is said to be at most k-additive if it is q-additive for some q ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We
denote by Gk(N) the set of all at most k-additive games.
The k-additive core, introduced by Grabisch and Miranda [7, 8, 10], and also by
Vassil’ev [14], is the set of efficient and coalitionally rational general payoff vectors, with
the restriction that payoffs are limited to coalitions of at most size k.
Definition 1. Let v be a game. The k-additive core3 of v, denoted by Ck(v), is given by
Ck(v) =
{
x ∈ R2N\∅ | ∑
T⊆S
xT ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N,
∑
T⊆N
xT = v(N), xT = 0,∀T ⊆ N, |T | > k
}
.
As before we may consider the k-additive core as a correspondence Ck : G(N)⇒ R2N\∅.
Example 3. We consider a game v on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
v(S) 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2
Let a general payoff vector x be defined by
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
xS 2 2 3 -1 -2 -2 0
It is easy to check that x satisfies coalitional rationality and efficiency. Moreover, x123 = 0,
hence x ∈ C2(v). The corresponding 2-additive game φ can be computed through the
inverse Mo¨bius transform (Equation (2)):
3The original definition is expressed through k-additive games, and is equivalent to this one. Specifi-
cally, viewing classical payoff vectors as additive games, the core can be defined as {φ ∈ G1(N) | φ(S) ≥
v(S),∀S ⊆ N,φ(N) = v(N)}. This viewpoint is the current one in decision theory, where coalitional
rationality is rather called dominance. Now, the generalization of this definition to k-additive games is
straightforward, and leads to the original definition of the k-additive core in [10] (and moreover explains
its name): {φ ∈ Gk(N) | φ(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ⊆ N,φ(N) = v(N)}. The equivalence is clearly seen by the
definition of k-additive games and Equation (2), and we see that the Mo¨bius transform plays the roˆle of
the generalized payoff vector. Although this view is mathematically more natural and elegant, we have
opted for the definition based on payoff vectors, since it is closer to game theory.
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S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
φ(S) 2 2 3 3 3 3 2
Theorem 1. [10] The k-additive core is a convex polyhedron, nonempty for k ≥ 2.
Ck(v) 6= ∅, ∀v ∈ G(N),∀k ≥ 2.
Unlike the core, the k-additive core is always nonempty. However, it is an unbounded
set, as shown by the next proposition.
Theorem 2. For all k ≥ 2, the k-additive core is unbounded and pointed4. Moreover,
for k = 2, its extremal rays are of the form 1i − 1ij, for all i 6= j ∈ N .
Proof. Since for any game v, the inclusion C2(v) ⊆ Ck(v) holds for any k ≥ 2, it suffices
to show that the 2-additive core is unbounded.
From standard results in polyhedra, studying the unboundedness of the 2-additive
core amounts to studying its recession cone, i.e., the set of inequalities where the right
member is replaced by 0 (see, e.g., [5, Ch. 1]). If the recession cone is a pointed cone
not reduced to {0}, then the corresponding polyhedron has vertices and rays. i.e., it is
unbounded. We denote naturally by C2(0) the recession cone of C2(v).
The system of inequalities defining x ∈ C2(0) reads:
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N
xi + xj + x{i,j} ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
{i,j}⊆S
x{i,j} ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ N, 2 < |S| < n
∑
i∈N
xi +
∑
{i,j}⊆N
x{i,j} = 0.
We claim that any vector of the form r = 1i − 1{i,j}, i.e., having value 1 for coordinate
i, −1 for coordinate {i, j}, and 0 otherwise, is an extremal ray. Indeed, the vector αr
satisfies the above system for any α > 0, and it cannot be expressed as the sum of other
rays since any ray must have at least 2 nonzero coordinates. Note also that there is no
other extremal ray.
As a conclusion, the 2-additive core is unbounded.
Let us show that the k-additive core is pointed. This amounts to finding in the system
of equalities ∑ T⊆S
|T |≤k
xT = 0, S ⊆ N , a subsystem of exactly n+
(
n
2
)
+ · · ·+
(
n
k
)
equations
whose unique solution is the zero vector. For this, it suffices to take those corresponding
to all S such that |S| ≤ k.
Proposition 1. For all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ck satisfies (COV), (IDEM), (SYM), and (CR).
Moreover, if we denote by CR the set of general solutions which satisfies (CR), we have:
Cn = >(CR).
Proof. We prove only (IDEM), the rest being clear. For clarity, we introduce the notation
ck = m−1(Ck). Then, it amounts to prove ck ◦ ck = ck. Let v be a game on N . Take any
φ ∈ ck(v). Then φ ∈ ck(φ), therefore φ ∈ ck(ck(v))
4A polyhedron is pointed if it has vertices (equivalently, if it contains no line).
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Conversely, if φ ∈ ck(ck(v)), then ∃ψ ∈ ck(v) such that φ ∈ ck(ψ). We have φ(S) ≥
ψ(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N and φ(N) = ψ(N) = v(N). Since φ is k-additive we have
φ ∈ ck(v).
2.4 The G-extended core
In this section we introduce a new general solution based on the principle of the extended
core EC(v) of Bejan and Gomez. Given a game v and t ≥ 0, define its t-expansion vt
by vt(S) := v(S) for all S ⊂ N , and vt(N) := v(N) + t. Now, to any game v we assign
t¯(v) := min{t ≥ 0 | C(vt) 6= ∅}, the minimum amount to be given to the grand coalition
in order to ensure balancedness. Given v a game and x a preimputation, we introduce
the real number t(v, x) := min{l(N) | l ∈ Rn+ and (x+ l)(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N}.
Bejan and Gomez [2] have introduced the concept of extended core of v as follows:
EC(v) := {x ∈ PI(v) | t(v, x) = t¯(v)}.
The extended core of v coincides with the core whenever C(v) 6= ∅. It is the set of
preimputations x for which there exists lx ∈ Rn+ such that (x+ lx)(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N
and
∑
i∈N
lxi = t¯(v). In other words, the extended core is the set of those preimputations
that require a minimal subsidy to the grand coalition.
Since the extended core is a set of preimputations, it is not a general solution as
announced in the introduction. However, a general solution is inherent in the way Bejan
and Gomez use the extended core: given a tax rule, take any vector in the core of vt¯(v)
(where precisely the amount t¯(v) has been given to the grand coalition) and tax every
player according to the chosen rule, where the tax is t¯(v). In what follows, we propose a
rewriting of the extended core as a general solution, which we call the G-extended core.
Consider z ∈ EC(v) and its associated vector lz ∈ Rn+ as above. We build from z a
general payoff vector xz defined as follows:
xzS =

zi + lzi , if S = {i}
−t¯(v), if S = N
0, otherwise.
Based on this, we define the G-extended core of v as follows.
Definition 2. Let v be a game. Its G-extended core is the set defined by
GEC(v) := {xz ∈ R2N\∅ | z ∈ EC(v)},
or equivalently
GEC(v) = {x ∈ R2N\∅ | (xi)i∈N ∈ C(vt¯(v)), xN = −t¯(v), xS = 0 otherwise}.
Proposition 2. The following properties hold for GEC.
(i) GEC(v) is a nonempty convex and compact polyhedral set for all v ∈ G(N). It is
equal to the core5 if the latter is nonempty.
5Up to the natural identification between payoff vectors and general payoff vectors.
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(ii) GEC satisfies (CR). Hence, GEC(v) ⊆ Cn(v).
(iii) GEC satisfies (IDEM), (COV), (SYM) and (MGD).
Proof. Most of the properties are clear by definition. We detail only (IDEM). As before,
we use the shorthand c for m−1(C), as well as gec = m−1 ◦ GEC. We suppose first that v
is balanced. Therefore, gec(v) = c(v) and the property holds since c ◦ c = c.
Suppose then that v is not balanced. Take any φ ∈ gec(v) and let us prove that φ ∈
gec(φ). Since φ ≥ v and φ(N) = v(N), we have t¯(φ) ≥ t¯(v). We have (φi)i∈N ∈ c(φt¯(v)),
since for all S 6= N , ∑i∈S φi ≥ φ(S), and ∑i∈N φi = v(N) + t¯(v) = φ(N) + t¯(v). This
proves that t¯(φ) = t¯(v), and consequently φ ∈ gec(φ). In conclusion, gec(v) ⊆ gec◦gec(v).
Conversely, let φ ∈ gec ◦ gec(v). Then there exists ψ ∈ gec(v) such that φ ∈ gec(ψ).
Reasoning as above, we find that t¯(ψ) = t¯(v). Then for any S 6= N we have ∑i∈S φi ≥
ψ(S) ≥ v(S), and ∑i∈N φi = ψ(N) + t¯(v) = v(N) + t¯(v). Lastly, mφ(N) = −t¯(v), which
proves that φ ∈ gec(v).
We observe that although the global amount of debt is minimal, it is concentrated
only on the grand coalition and therefore does not necessarily optimally express how
far it is possible to tax each coalition. By contrast, in the k-additive core, the smallest
coalitions are in charge of distributing the debt.
3 The minimum negotiation set
The principle of the k-additive core is: if a payment xS is given to coalitions S up to size
k, that is, if each player accepts to pool a part of his gain with the other players, it is
possible to preserve coalitional rationality. However, we can note two important problems
of the k-additive core: First, for k ≥ 2, the k-additive core is unbounded, secondly, there
could be a conflict between the agents of a coalition S on how the payment xS made
by the k-additive core will be allocated to each player. Two situations can occur: either
the payment is positive (a benefit has to be shared), or it is negative (a debt has to be
shared). Sharing implies that each player in the coalition receives a nonnegative amount
in case of benefit, and has to pay a nonnegative amount in case of debt6. The more there
are coalitions S with high amounts |xS|, the more the solution x involves negotiation
among the agents in N . The idea of the minimum negotiation set is to select those
solutions in the k-additive core which involve the “fewest” negotation. Here, “fewest” is
defined through a norm of the vector of payments made to coalitions of size at least 2.
Taking the family of Lp norms, we may consider the three usual cases: the L1 norm (the
negotiation level is the sum of absolute values of the payments), the L2 norm (sum of
squares of payments: high payments are over-weighted), and the L∞ norm (the maximal
payment is the negotiation level).
Another view of the minimal negotiation set is that it is the set of solutions mini-
mizing the distance (defined through the norm) to the set of preimputations. Hence the
6A more general solution would be to allow real-valued amounts, that is, even in the case of benefit,
some players would have to pay something. But we do not see any convincing example where this method
would be relevant. In game theory, for example when defining the selectope [4], sharing functions are
assumed to take values in [0, 1]. It is the same for division rules in bankruptcy or tax problems [13]
(another way to consider the above sharing problem; see Section 5).
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negotiation level of a payoff of the k-additive core can be seen as a kind of measure of its
deviation from additivity.
3.1 The set Ik(v) of minimal negotiation
Let 2 ≤ k ≤ n be fixed and ‖ · ‖ be a norm on R2n .
We consider the following nonlinear program:
Minimize B‖·‖(x) := ‖(xS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖
subject to x ∈ Ck(v).
We call B‖·‖(x) the negotiation level of x. For a game v ∈ G(N) and  ≥ 0, we define the
set Ck (v) by
Ck (v) := {x ∈ Ck(v), B‖·‖(x) ≤ }
and the set Ik(v) by
Ik(v) :=
⋂
≥0
Ck (v)6=∅
Ck (v).
Ik(v) is nonempty for all games in G(N) because Ck(v) 6= ∅ implies that there exists 0
such that Ck0(v) 6= ∅. Moreover, Ik(v) is the set of optimal solutions of the above nonlinear
program.
Theorem 3. Let v ∈ G(N), 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and  ≥ 0. The following statements hold:
(i) ∀ ≥ 0, Ck (v) is a convex and compact set which is equal7 to C(v) if  = 0.
(ii) Ik(v) is a nonempty convex and compact set, equal to C(v) if C(v) 6= ∅, otherwise
∃∗ > 0 such that Ik(v) = Ck∗(v).
Proof. (i) It is obvious that Ck0(v) = C(v). Also, Ck (v) is closed ∀ ≥ 0, and if 0 ≤
1 ≤ 2, then Ck1(v) ⊆ Ck2(v).
Let us prove convexity. If a and b are in Ck (v) then ∀t ∈ [0, 1], the payoff vector
ta + (1 − t)b is in Ck(v) because Ck(v) is convex. Furthermore, by convexity of
x 7→ ‖x‖,
‖(taS + (1− t)bS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖ ≤ t ‖(aS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤
+(1− t) ‖(bS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤
,
from which we deduce that Ck (v) is convex.
It remains to prove compactness. Suppose a ∈ Ck (v). By definition,
‖(aS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖ ≤ ,
7Up to the natural identification between payoff vectors and general payoff vectors. The same remark
applies to the next item.
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which implies that each component aS, |S| ≥ 2, is bounded, and so is ∑S⊆N
|S|≥2
aS.
Now we have:
v(N) =
∑
i∈N
ai +
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
aS,
which implies that ∑i∈N ai is bounded. Since a ∈ Ck(v), we have ai ≥ v(i) for all
i ∈ N . Hence, each ai is bounded. It follows that each coordinate aS is bounded,
therefore Ck (v) is compact.
(ii) Ik(v) is an intersection of compact, convex and nonempty nested sets, therefore Ik(v)
is a compact, convex and nonempty set. It is easy to see that if C(v) is nonempty
then Ik(v) = C(v).
Let us define
∗ = sup{ ≥ 0 such that Ck (v) = ∅}
with the convention sup(∅) = 0. It is easily verified that Ck∗(v) ⊆ Ik(v) and, ∀n ∈ N,
the set Ik(v) satisfies Ik(v) ⊆ Ck
∗+ 1
n
(v). Therefore
Ik(v) ⊆ ∩n∈N∗Ck∗+ 1
n
(v) = Ck∗(v).
Hence ∃∗ ≥ 0 such that Ik(v) = Ck∗(v) and ∀x ∈ Ik(v), we have B‖·‖(x) = ∗.
The next proposition gathers properties of elements of Ik(v).
Proposition 3. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ n be fixed, ‖ · ‖ be a given norm which is strictly increasing
in each coordinate8, and v ∈ G(N). For any element x ∈ Ik(v), it holds:
(i) xS ≤ 0, ∀S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2.
(ii) The corresponding k-additive game φ = m−1(x) is concave.
(iii) The vector (xi)i∈N belongs to C(vB‖·‖1 (x)), where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 norm.
(iv)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
xS
∣∣∣∣ ≥ t¯(v).
Proof. (i) Let x ∈ Ik(v). Suppose that xS > 0 for some S with |S| ≥ 2, then the
general payoff vector xeq defined by :
xeqi = xi + 1|S|xS, ∀i ∈ S
xeqS = 0
xeqT = xT otherwise,
belongs to Ck(v), satisfies xeqS = 0 and B‖·‖(xeq) < B‖·‖(x) since ‖ · ‖ is strictly
increasing, which contradicts x ∈ Ik(v).
8This is the case of all Lp norms, except L∞. However, for the latter a simple modification of the
proof makes the statement valid for L∞ too: it suffices to take for S a maximizer of xS and assume that
xS is positive.
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(ii) It is known [3] that concavity of φ is equivalent to ∑S|A⊆S⊆Bmφ(S) ≤ 0 for every
A,B such that |A| = 2 and B ⊇ A, which holds by (i) since mφ(S) = xS.
(iii) Let x ∈ Ik(v). By (i), xS ≤ 0 for all S such that |S| ≥ 2. Then, ∑S⊆N
|S|≥2
xS =
−B‖·‖1(x) and the vector (xi)i∈N satisfies∑
i∈S
xi ≥
∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
T⊆S
|T |≥2
xT
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≥ v(S) = vB‖·‖1 (x)(S), S 6= N, |S| ≥ 2
∑
i∈N
xi =v(N)−
∑
T⊆N
|T |≥2
xT
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−B‖·‖1(x)
= vB‖·‖1(x)(N).
(iv) By (iii), C(vB‖·‖1 (x)) is nonempty. Hence by definition of t¯(v), we have t¯(v) ≤ B‖·‖1(x).
By (i), B‖·‖1(x) =
∣∣∣∣ ∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
xS
∣∣∣∣, hence the result.
We comment on these results. (i) shows that only negative or zero payments are given
to coalitions. Hence, if the game is non-balanced, the debts implied by the satisfaction of
coalitional rationality are to be paid by groups, not individuals, and (iii) shows the exact
nature of the payment given to individuals. (iv) shows that the total amount of debts
may exceed the minimal amount t¯(v), hence axiom (MGD) may be not satisfied. We will
prove later that for the L1 norm, (MGD) is always satisfied.
3.2 The minimum negotiation set as a general solution
Ik(v) being a subset of the k-additive core Ck(v), it is a general solution, preserving
the desirable properties of the k-additive core without having its drawbacks. Indeed, it
preserves coalitional rationality, it is never empty and coincides with the core when the
latter is nonempty as shown in Theorem 3, and unlike the k-additive core, it is bounded,
and can even be reduced to a singleton when the Lp norm with p > 1 is used, as it will
be shown in Section 3.5.
In this section and the subsequent ones, we will investigate the properties of this
general solution. The next proposition shows that the minimum negotiation set satisfies
all properties of general solutions satisfied by the k-additive core.
Proposition 4. Ik satisfies (CR), (COV), (SYM) and (IDEM) for any norm.
Proof. (CR): Clear.
(COV): Ik satisfies (COV) if and only if ∀v ∈ G(N),∀α > 0,∀β ∈ R2n−1 we have:
Ik(αv + β) = αIk(v) + β.
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Since Ck(v) satisfies (COV),
Minimize B‖·‖(x) := ‖(xS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖
subject to x ∈ Ck(αv + β)
is equivalent to
Minimize B‖·‖(x) := ‖(xS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖
subject to x ∈ αCk(v) + β.
(SYM): Similarly, since Ck(v) satisfies (SYM), we have that for all permutations pi
such that v(pi(S)) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N ,
Minimize B‖·‖(x) := ‖(xS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖
subject to x ∈ Ck(v)
is equivalent to
Minimize B‖·‖(x) := ‖(xS)S⊆N
|S|≥2
‖
subject to x ∈ Ck(v ◦ pi).
(IDEM): Here also we use the shorthand c = m−1(C), and i = m−1(i). We have to
show that ik ◦ ik = ik. First, if ik(v) = c(v), then for each x ∈ c(v), considering x as an
additive game, we have ik(x) = {x}. Therefore ik(c(v)) = c(v).
Now, suppose c(v) = ∅ and take any φ ∈ ik(v). Since φ ∈ ck(v), it follows that
ck(φ) ⊆ ck(v). Therefore, since φ minimizes the negotiation level over ck(v), φ minimizes
the negotiation level over ck(φ), which implies φ ∈ ik(φ) and
ik(v) ⊆ ik(ik(v)).
Let φ ∈ ik(ik(v)). Then there exists ψ ∈ ik(v) such that φ ∈ ik(ψ). Observe that
ψ ∈ ck(ψ) ⊆ ck(v). Since ψ minimizes the negotiation level over ck(v) and φ minimizes the
negotiation level over ck(ψ), it follows that these negotiation levels are equal. Moreover,
φ is a k-additive game which satisfies φ(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N and φ(N) = v(N).
Therefore φ ∈ ik(v) and
ik(ik(v)) ⊆ ik(v).
3.3 Properties of In1
In this section, ‖ · ‖ is the L1 norm. We denote by Ik1 the solution Ik for the L1 norm.
By Proposition 4, we know that Ik1 satisfies (CR), (COV), (SYM) and (IDEM). In
addition, we show that In1 satisfies (DPP) and (MGD).
Proposition 5. In1 satisfies (DPP) and (MGD).
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Proof. (i) We prove (MGD) first. Let v be a game in G(N), and x ∈ C(vt¯(v)). It is clear
that the general payoff vector y defined by
yi = xi, ∀i ∈ N
yS = 0, ∀S ⊆ N,S 6= N and |S| ≥ 2
yN = −t¯(v)
belongs to Cn(v). We have
B‖·‖1 =
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
|yS| = t¯(v).
Therefore ∀z ∈ In1 (v), we have∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
|zS| = B‖·‖1 ≤ B‖·‖1 = t¯(v).
By Proposition 3 (i), ∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
|zS| = |
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
zS|
and by Proposition 3 (iv), ∣∣∣∣ ∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
zS
∣∣∣∣ ≥ t¯(v).
Therefore, In1 satisfies (MGD).
(ii) We prove now (DPP). By (MGD) and Proposition 3 (i) the negotiation level
is equal to t¯(v), and by Proposition 3 (iii), we deduce that for all y ∈ In1 (v), we have
(yi)i∈N ∈ C(vt¯(v)).
Suppose i is dummy for v and take x ∈ C(vt¯(v)). Then the vector x∗ ∈ Rn defined by:
x∗i = v(i) and x∗j = xj for j ∈ N \ i satisfies:
x∗(N) ≤ x(N)
x∗(S) = x(S) ≥ v(S), if i /∈ S
x∗(S) = x(S \ i) + v(i) ≥ v(S \ i) + v(i) = v(S), if i ∈ S.
Therefore x∗(N) = x(N), which entails xi = x∗i = v(i), proving that In1 satisfies (DPP).
The next theorem is a characterization of In1 .
Theorem 4. Let MGDCR be the set of general solutions satisfying (MGD) and (CR).
Then In1 = >(MGDCR).
In words, In1 is the largest general solution satisfying coalitional rationality and mini-
mizing the amount of the global debt.
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Proof. We already know that In1 satisfies (CR), and by Proposition 5, we know that In1
satisfies (MGD).
Conversely, let σ be a general solution which satisfies (CR) and (MGD). Let x ∈ σ(v).
Since σ satisfies (CR), x ∈ Cn(v) because Cn(v) = >(CR). Moreover, since σ satisfies
(MGD), the negotiation level of x is equal to the negotiation level of each element of
In1 (v). Therefore x minimizes the negotiation level over Cn(v).
We conclude that x ∈ In1 (v) and ∀v ∈ G(N), σ(v) ⊆ In1 (v).
Remark 1. We have seen that GEC satisfies (MGD) and (CR). Therefore we have the
following inclusions:
C(v) ⊆ GEC(v) ⊆ In1 (v) ⊆ Cn(v),
for all games v. It follows that GEC inherits the properties of In1 .
From the above results, we notice the following important fact.
Corollary 1. Let v ∈ G(N). We have:
{(xi)i∈N | x ∈ In1 (v)} = C(vt¯(v)) = {(xi)i∈N | x ∈ GEC(v)}.
Proof. We prove the first equality. From the proof of Proposition 5, we see that for all
x ∈ In1 (v), it holds (xi)i∈N ∈ C(vt¯(v)). The reverse inclusion holds by Remark 1.
Now, the second equality holds by definition of GEC.
These two last results elucidate the nature of In1 (v) and its relation to previously
introduced notions like the extended core. In a sense, we may say that elements of
GEC(v) and In1 (v) implement or realize elements of C(vt¯(v)), which are not solutions of
the game v. Indeed, by GEC(v), an element x of C(vt¯(v)) becomes realizable by putting
a debt t¯(v) on the grand coalition N . Now, In1 (v), by allowing to putting debts on any
coalition of size at least 2, gives the possibility of a negociation in any coalition.
Proposition 6. In1 is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
Proof. We set in1 = m−1 ◦ In1 and prove upper hemicontinuity of in1 . It is sufficient to prove
that in1 is a closed and bounded correspondence (see, e.g., [11, Ch. 9]).
Gr(in1 ) = {(v, φ) ∈ G(N)2, φ(N) = v(N), φ(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N,
mφS ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2, and
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
mφ(S) = −t¯(v)}
is a closed subset of G(N)2. Let B be a compact subset of G(N). We define w1 and w2
two games such that
w1(S) = inf
v∈B
v(S) and w2(S) = sup
v∈B
v(S).
Let φ ∈ in1 (B) = ∪v∈B in1 (v). Obviously, for all S ⊆ N , we have
w1(S) ≤ φ(S).
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We prove now that for all S ⊆ N , φ(S) ≤ nmaxS⊆N w2(S). Let ψ be an additive game
defined by
ψ(i) = max
S⊆N
w2(S) ∀i ∈ N.
Clearly, ∀v ∈ B, v(S) ≤ ∑i∈S ψ(i), hence, ∀v ∈ B,
v(N) + t¯(v) ≤∑
i∈N
ψ(i) ≤ nmax
S⊆N
w2(S).
Suppose there exists S ⊆ N such that nmaxS⊆N w2(S) < φ(S). Then there exists v ∈ B
such that
nmax
S⊆N
w2(S) < φ(S) ≤
∑
i∈N
φ(i) = v(N) + t¯(v) ≤ nmax
S⊆N
w2(S),
a contradiction.
3.4 Autonomous coalitions
We introduce now the concept of autonomous coalition. Consider a game v and the core
C(vt¯(v)) of its t-expansion. Suppose it exists a coalition T 6= N such that, for any payoff
x ∈ C(vt¯(v)), x(T ) = v(T ). It means that the coalition can never receive more than its
worth v(T ). Moreover, if the game is not balanced, the debt t¯(v) > 0 has to be paid
anyway by the players, so that it is likely that the members of T will eventually receive
in total strictly less than v(T ). Such a game is unstable, because S has nothing to gain
from cooperation (and in case v is not balanced, S may even have incentive to leave),
and therefore can remain independent of the grand coalition. In this sense, we say that
S is autonomous.
In what follows, first we show that there always exists an autonomous coalition when
the game is not balanced, and second, we show how to characterize them, and how it is
possible to find them in a very easy way by In1 (v). We think that it is an important issue
to detect autonomous coalitions since they are the source of instability of the game.
Definition 3. We say that a coalition T ⊂ N is autonomous if for any payoff vector x
of C(vt¯(v)), it holds x(T ) = v(T ).
For any coalition T ⊂ N , we denote by vT the restriction of v to the coalition T . As
an immediate consequence of the definition, we remark that C(vT ) is nonempty whenever
T is autonomous. Indeed, any element x of C(vt¯(v)) is such that (xi)i∈T ∈ C(vT ).
Proposition 7. Any non-balanced game v has an autonomous coalition T ⊂ N .
Proof. Suppose that v is not balanced, and that ∀T ⊂ N , ∃x ∈ C(vt¯(v)) such that
x(T ) > v(T ). Then, the convexity of C(vt¯(v)) implies that there exists x′ such that
∀T ⊂ N , x′(T ) > v(T ). Let T ′ ∈ arg min
T⊆N
(x′(T )− v(T )). The vector x˜ defined by:
x˜i =
x
′
i − x(T
′)−v(T ′)
|T | , if i ∈ T ′
x′i, otherwise
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satisfies
x˜(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N
and
x˜(N) < x(N) = v(N) + t¯(v).
This is not possible by definition of t¯(v).
It is easy to find all autonomous coalitions. It suffices to compute the coordinates
(x¯i)i∈N of the barycenter of GEC(v) (or equivalently of the barycenter of In1 (v)). By
Corollary 1, it is plain that T 6= N is autonomous if and only if ∑i∈T x¯i = v(T ).
The next theorem gives another way to detect the greatest autonomous coalitions.
Theorem 5. Let v be a game on N , and S be a coalition of N such that |S| ≥ 2. The
following properties are equivalent:
(i) There exists T ⊇ S such that T is autonomous.
(ii) ∀x ∈ In1 (v), xS = 0.
(see proof in the appendix)
The above result says that the greatest (in the sense of inclusion) autonomous coali-
tions correspond to coalitions T such that xT = 0 for all x ∈ In1 (v), and any superset of T
does not satisfy this property. Combining this with the fact for all x ∈ In1 (v), xS ≤ 0 for
all S, |S| ≥ 2 (Proposition 3 (i)), the barycenter x¯ of In1 (v) permits to detect autonomous
coalitions as follows: T is autonomous if x¯T = 0 and x¯T∪i < 0 for all i ∈ N \ T .
3.5 Properties of Ikp with p ∈]1,+∞[
In this section, ‖ · ‖ is the Lp norm, with p > 1:
‖x‖p =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
.
We denote by Ikp the general solution Ik for the norm Lp.
Theorem 6. Let p > 1. Then Ikp(v) = C(v) if C(v) 6= ∅, otherwise Ikp(v) reduces to the
unique element of Ck(v) which minimizes the negotiation level.
Proof. Let a and b be two different payoff vectors in Ikp(v). From Theorem 3 (ii), there
exists ∗ ≥ 0 such that Ikp(v) = Ck∗(v), and, for t ∈]0, 1[, the payoff vector ta + (1 − t)b
belongs to Ikp(v) by convexity, so in particular for t = 12 . If ∗ = 0 then Ikp = C(v),
otherwise we have, by Proposition 3 (i) :
(B‖·‖(a))p =
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(−aS)p = (∗)p
(B‖·‖(b))p =
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(−bS)p = (∗)p
(
B‖·‖
(
a+ b
2
))p
=
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(
− 12aS −
1
2bS
)p
= (∗)p.
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Now, if ∗ 6= 0 and a 6= b, we have by strict convexity of x 7→ xp on [0,+∞):
(∗)p =
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(
− 12aS −
1
2bS
)p
<
1
2
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(−aS)p + 12
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
(−bS)p = (∗)p,
a contradiction. Therefore ∗ = 0 or a = b.
To conclude, if ∗ = 0 then Ikp(v) = C(v), otherwise a = b and Ikp(v) = {a}.
Unlike In1 , the general solution Ikp does not satisfy (MGD), as shown by the following
example with p = 2.
Example 4. We suppose that k = 2, and consider a game v on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
v(S) 0 0 0 1 1 0 1− 
Clearly, t¯(v) =  and I22(v) reduces to a singleton. If (MGD) holds, the minimum negoti-
ation level is , hence by Proposition 3 (iii), ((I22(v))i)i∈N belongs to C(v) = {(1, 0, 0)}.
This implies in turn 
1 + (I22(v))12 ≥ 1 ⇒ (I22(v))12 ≥ 0
1 + (I22(v))13 ≥ 1 ⇒ (I22(v))13 ≥ 0
(I22(v))23 ≥ 0.
This is impossible because by Proposition 3 (i), (I22(v))ij ≤ 0 for all {i, j} ⊆ N , and by
MGD, (I22(v))12 + (I22(v))13 + (I22(v))23 = −.
4 Computation of the minimum negotiation set
In general the minimum negotiation set Ik(v) is difficult to compute because it is a general
nonlinear optimization problem. However, in the case of the L1 norm, the optimization
problem reduces to a linear program. We have also some partial result for the case of the
L2 norm.
4.1 Computation of Ik1
Proposition 8. The set Ik1(v) is the solution of the linear program:
maximize
∑
S⊆N
2≤|S|≤k
xS
under the conditions :
i)
∑
S⊆N
xS = v(N)
ii)
∑
S⊆T
xS ≥ v(T ) ∀T ⊆ N
iii) xS ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2.
iv) xS = 0 ∀S ⊆ N such that |S| > k.
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Proof. Each x ∈ Ik1(v) ⊆ Ck(v) is such that x satisfies i), ii), and iv). Furthermore
Proposition 3 (i) implies that xS ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, which is iii). Lastly, minimizing∑
S⊆N
2≤|S|≤k
|yS| for y ∈ Ck(v) is equivalent to maximize
∑
S⊆N
2≤|S|≤k
yS under the conditions y ∈
Ck(v) and yS ≤ 0, ∀|S| ≥ 2.
Example 5. We consider a game v on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
v(S) 20 40 30 40 40 40 50
We have C(v) = ∅, and ∀t ∈ [0, 1], the payoff vector x defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
xS 20 40 30 −20t −10t −10t −40(1− t)
belongs to In1 (v), and we observe that the optimal value of the objective function is
−t¯(v) = −40.
4.2 Computation of Ik2
Giving an exact expression of Ik2 in the general case is quite difficult because it is necessary
to solve a quadratic program. However, we can obtain an exact expression of I22 in the
case of a symmetric9 and subadditive game.
Proposition 9. If v is a nonnegative, symmetric and subadditive game on N then :
(I22(v))i = max
k∈{1,...,n−1}
{
n− 1
k(n− k)vk −
k − 1
n(n− k)vn
}
, ∀i ∈ N
(I22(v))ij =
2
n(n− 1) (v(N)− n(I2(v))1) , ∀i, j ∈ N
where vk := v(K), |K| = k.
Proof. Subadditivity of v implies C(v) = ∅ or reduced to a singleton. Therefore I22(v) is a
singleton.
Now, symmetry of v implies by definition of I22 that ∀i ∈ N , (I22(v))i = (I22(v))1 and
∀i, j ∈ N , (I22(v))ij = (I22(v))12.
Denote by α the value of (I22(v))1 and by β the value of (I22(v))12. I22(v) ⊆ C2(v)
therefore, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
k(k − 1)
2 β + kα ≥ vk
and
n(n− 1)
2 β + nα = vn.
9A game v is symmetric if v(S) depends only on the cardinality of S for each S.
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These two expressions are equivalent to:
β = 2
(
vn − nα
n(n− 1)
)
(∗)
and ∀k 6= n and n 6= 1
α ≥ n− 1
k(n− k)vk −
k − 1
n(n− k)vn (∗∗)
Furthermore, v is symmetric, therefore, the minimization of B‖·‖(x) under the condition
x ∈ C2(v) is equivalent to the minimization of (β)2 under the conditions (∗) and (∗∗),
i.e., the maximization of β since β ≤ 0 by Proposition 3 (i). This amounts to the
maximization of vn − nα, hence the minization of α. The minimum is reached for α =
maxk∈{1,...,n−1}
{
n−1
k(n−k)vk − k−1n(n−k)vn
}
and β = 2
(
vn+n(n−2)α
n(n−1)
)
.
Example 6. We consider a symmetric subadditive game v on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
v(S) 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2
We have C(v) = ∅. Using the above result, we get:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
(I22(v))S 1 1 1 −13 −13 −13 0
5 From general payoff vectors to classical payoff vec-
tors
As explained in the introduction, the ultimate step when using a general solution is to
transform selected general payoff vectors into classical payoff vectors, i.e., sharing among
individual players.
A first way to deal with this problem is to consider the selectope [4] of the game
corresponding to a general payoff vector. Let us first recall some material on the selectope.
We consider the set of sharing functions given by:
Q(N) := {q : 2N \ {∅} ×N → [0, 1] | q(S, i) = 0 if i /∈ S,∑
i∈S
q(S, i) = 1,∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅}.
For each subset S and each player i in S, the sharing function specifies the proportion of
a good (assigned to S) which should be given to i, noting that nothing is given to players
outside S. Each sharing function q induces a sharing value xq defined by:
xq : G(N)→ Rn such that xqi (v) :=
∑
S3i
q(S, i)mv(S), i ∈ N.
Thus, the sharing value shares among players the dividends (Mo¨bius transform) mv(S),
S ⊆ N , according to the sharing rule q. The selectope [4] of a game v ∈ G(N), denoted
by S(v), is defined as the set of all preimputations which can be obtained by sharing
functions applied on mv:
S(v) := {xq(v), q ∈ Q(N)}.
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Let us come back to our concern and consider a game v and a general payoff vector
x belonging for example to the k-additive core Ck(v) or any other general solution of v.
The simplest way to transform x into a classical payoff vector is to share each component
xS for |S| > 1 among the members of S using some sharing rule q ∈ Q(N). In other
words, recalling that general payoff vectors can be seen as games through the Mo¨bius
transform, the set of all possible (classical) payoff vectors which can be derived from x is
the selectope of the game m−1(x).
As before, we use as a shorthand ck = m−1(Ck), in1 = m−1(In1 ), gec = m−1(GEC), etc.
The following result shows that any preimputation can be attained from the k-additive
core by a sharing function.
Theorem 7 (Grabisch and Li, 2010 [7]). For any xq, q ∈ Q(N) such that q(K, i) > 0 for
all K ⊆ N and i ∈ K, for any v ∈ G(N), for any k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we have
xq(ck)(v) = PI(v).
where PI(v) is the set of preimputations.
More interestingly, restricting to the minimum negotiation set, we obtain by using all
sharing functions the extended core of Bejan and Gomez.
Theorem 8. The selectope of in1 (v) is given by:
S(in1 (v)) = S(gec(v)) = C(vt¯(v))− t¯(v)∆n = EC(v)
where ∆n := {η ∈ [0, 1]n | ∑
i∈{1,...,n}
ηi = 1}.
Proof. Take φ ∈ in1 (v). Since In1 satisfies (MGD), and by Proposition 3 (i), we have
(φ(1), . . . , φ(n)) ∈ C(vt¯(v)). Therefore S(φ) ⊆ C(vt¯(v))− t¯(v)∆n.
Conversely, since GEC(v) ⊆ In1 (v) by Remark 1, we have S(gec(v)) ⊆ S(in1 (v)). Let
φ ∈ gec(v). We denote by φ+ and φ− the games defined by
φ+(T ) :=
∑
S⊆T
mφ(S)>0
mφ(S)
φ−(T ) := − ∑
S⊆T
mφ(S)<0
mφ(S).
By definition of gec(v), we have φ+(T ) = ∑i∈T mφ({i}) and φ−(T ) = 0 for T 6= N ,
and φ−(N) = t¯(v). Therefore C(φ+) = {φ+} and C(φ−) = t¯(v)∆n. Hence S(gec(v)) =
C(vt¯(v))− t¯(v)∆n.
In summary, we have shown
C(vt¯(v))− t¯(v)∆n = S(gec(v)) ⊆ S(in1 (v)) ⊆ C(vt¯(v))− t¯(v)∆n
so that equality holds throughout.
It is well known that the Shapley value can be obtained as a sharing and therefore
always belongs to the selectope of the game (it corresponds to the equal sharing). How-
ever, observe that, in general, the Shapley value does not belong to the selectope of In1 (v),
as shown by the following example.
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Example 7. We consider a game v on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by:
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
v(S) 0 0 0 1 1 0 910
Clearly, t¯(v) = 110 and C(vt¯(v)) = {(1, 0, 0)}.
Therefore the selectope of In1 (v) is:
S(In1 (v)) = {(1− η1,−η2,−η3), ηi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, and η1 + η2 + η3 =
1
10}
and the Shapley value of v is
Sh(v) = (1930 ,
4
30 ,
4
30) 6∈ S(I
n
1 (v)).
A more general way to make a sharing of the amounts given to coalitions is to put
the problem into a bankruptcy or tax problem. This was also considered by Bejan and
Gomez [2], however in their case the problem was simpler since only the grand coalition
has debt. We limit ourselves to giving the main ideas, a complete treatment of this topic
would deserve a whole study.
Consider some payoff x ∈ Ik(v), and the list of coalitions S1, . . . , Sp with |S| > 1 such
that xS < 0, ordered in a way which is compatible with inclusion (i.e., Si ⊂ Sj cannot
occur for i > j). Take S1 and define the following bankruptcy problem: the set of agents
is S1, the estate is φ(S1), where φ = m−1(x) is the game version of x, and the claims of
the agents are simply their individual payoff xi, i ∈ S1. This is a bankruptcy problem
because the estate is strictly less than the sum of demands:
φ(S1) =
∑
T⊆S1
xT =
∑
i∈S1
xi + xS <
∑
i∈S1
xi
by the ordering on the Si’s and since xS < 0. Taking some division rule (equal award
rule [13], Talmud rule [1], etc.), one ends up with a payment vector (x′1, . . . , x′n). Also, we
modify the game φ since the debt xS1 has been paid, as follows: φ′(S) =
∑
T⊆S,T 6=S1 xS,
and we set x′j = xi for all i 6∈ S1. Note that x′ ≤ x and φ′ ≥ φ.
We take now the next set S2 in the list and define a new bankruptcy problem with
estate φ′(S2) and claims x′i, i ∈ S2. Since x′ ≤ x and φ′ ≥ φ, it may happen that
the estate is sufficient to pay the claims. If not, we have again a bankruptcy problem,
and proceed as above. This leads to vector x′′ and we update the game φ′ as follows:
φ′′(S) = ∑T⊆S,T 6=S1,S2 xS. We continue the procedure till Sp.
Clearly, this way of sharing is more general since the underlying sharing function
depends in particular on x. We think for this reason that it is better suited to the
problem, although more complicated. Its full study is left for further research.
6 Concluding remarks
We summarize the main findings of the paper and indicate research perspectives.
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(i) We have proposed the idea of general payoff vectors and general solutions, based on
previous works like the k-additive core of Grabisch and Miranda, and the extended
core of Bejan and Gomez, which can be seen as a general solution (called here the
G-extended core (GEC)).
(ii) We have proposed the minimum negotiation set, as the subset of the k-additive core
minimizing the distance to classical preimputations. There are many advantages
considering this solution: it is compact and convex, never empty, it coincides with
the core if the latter is nonempty, guarantees coalitional rationality while minimizing
the amounts given to coalitions of size larger than 2. Properties of the minimum
negotiation set have been thoroughly investigated.
(iii) If the L1 norm is chosen for the minimum negotiation set, then one obtains a set
of general payoffs which includes GEC, and whose payments to individuals coincide
with the core elements of the t-expansion of the game (i.e., elements of C(vt¯(v))).
Moreover, it is guaranteed that the total debt to be paid by coalitions is minimal.
If the L2 norm is chosen or any Lp norm with p > 1, the advantage is to get a
single-valued solution, like the nucleolus. Further study is needed to investigate the
properties of this solution.
(iv) Ultimately, one should derive classical payoff vector(s) from the general payoff vector
chosen by the solution. A simple way to do this is to consider fixed sharing functions,
in order to share the debts on coalitions among its members. Taking all possible
sharing functions (the selectope) for In1 or GEC shows that we recover exactly the
extended core of Bejan and Gomez. A more clever way, although more complicated,
is to consider the payment of a debt by a coalition as a bankruptcy problem, and
use appropriate division rules. The latter proposition seems to be promising and
deserves further research.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5
First we need the following result.
Proposition 10. Let v be a game on N . Suppose it exists S ⊂ N , |S| ≥ 2, such that
for all x ∈ In1 (v), xS = 0. Then the following holds.
(i) For all x ∈ In1 (v), for all T ⊆ S, |T | ≥ 2, we have xT = 0.
(ii) There exists T ⊇ S, T 6= N , such that C(vT ) 6= ∅.
Proof. (i) Suppose there exists x ∈ In1 (v) and T ⊆ S such that xS = 0 and xT < 0. Then
the payoff x′ defined by
x′T = 0
x′S = xT
x′K = xK , ∀K 66= T, S
belongs to In1 (v), which contradicts the definition of S.
(ii) Take S ⊂ N , |S| ≥ 2, such that for all x ∈ In1 (v), xS = 0. We prove that if ∀T ⊇ S,
T 6= N , we have C(vT ) = ∅, then there exists x ∈ In1 (v) such that xS < 0.
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Let x˜ ∈ GEC(v) ⊆ In1 (v). We put
t = min
T⊇S,T 6=N
{∑
K⊆T
x˜K − v(T )}.
Observe that t > 0. Indeed, t = 0 would imply that for some T ⊇ S, T 6= N ,∑
K⊆T x˜K = v(T ). Since x˜ ∈ GEC, its coordinates are 0 for all nonsingleton subsets of T .
Therefore, ∑i∈T ′ x˜i ≥ v(T ′) for all T ′ ⊂ T , and ∑i∈T x˜i = v(T ). It follows that the vector
(x˜i)i∈N is an element of the core C(vT ), a contradiction.
Then the general payoff vector x defined by
xK =x˜K , ∀K ⊂ N, K 6= S
xS =− t
xN =− t¯(v) + t
belongs to In1 (v).
(of Theorem 5). (i)⇒ (ii). Let x ∈ In1 (v). By Corollary 1, we have (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C(vt¯(v)),
which yields ∑i∈T xi = v(T ). Therefore if xS < 0, we would have ∑S⊆T xT < v(T ), which
contradicts x ∈ In1 (v).
(ii) ⇒ (i). Define T as a maximal element (in the sense of inclusion) of {L ⊇ S, xL =
0, ∀x ∈ In1 (v)}. Suppose T = N . Then for all x ∈ In1 (v), xN = 0, which implies that
t¯(v) = 0 since GEC(v) ⊆ In1 (v). Therefore C(v) 6= ∅, and (i) holds for T = N .
We assume now that T 6= N . Due to Proposition 10 (i) and the definition of T , for
any set L ⊆ T , |L| ≥ 2, we have xL = 0 for all x ∈ In1 (v), and for all L ⊃ T , xL 6= 0 for
at least one x ∈ In1 (v). It follows that∑
i∈T
xi =
∑
K⊆T
xK , ∀x ∈ In1 (v).
For the rest of the proof, we introduce the shorthand φx for m−1(x), where x is a general
payoff vector. From the above equation and Corollary 1, it suffices to show that φx(T ) =
v(T ) for all x ∈ In1 (v) in order to prove that y(T ) = v(T ) for all y ∈ C(vt¯(v)). Suppose
then that there exists x0 ∈ In1 (v) such that φx0(T ) > v(T ). We distinguish two cases.
Suppose first that T = N \ i. Suppose there exists x ∈ In1 (v) such that φx(N \ i) >
v(N \ i). Take x′ ∈ In1 (v) such that x′N < 0 (necessarily exists otherwise T = N), and
build the payoff vector x′′ = 12(x+ x
′). Define x˜ by
x˜K =

max(v(N \ i)− φx′′(N \ i), x′′N) < 0, if K = N \ i
x′′N − x˜N\i, if K = N
x′′K , otherwise.
Then x˜ ∈ In1 (v), although x˜N\i < 0, a contradiction.
Suppose next that T is not of the form N \ i. We know that for all T ′ ⊃ T , T ′ 6= N ,
there exists xT ′ ∈ In1 (v) such that xT ′T ′ < 0. Define x˜ =
∑
T ′⊃T,T ′ 6=N αT ′xT
′ , with αT ′ ∈
(0, 1), ∑T ′⊃T,T ′ 6=N αT ′ = 1. Then by convexity of In1 (v), it follows that x˜ ∈ In1 (v), and we
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have x˜T ′ < 0, for all T ′ ⊃ T , T 6= N . Consider the payoff vector x′ = 12(x0 + x˜), which
belongs to In1 (v) by convexity, and put
 = min(φx′(T )− v(T ), min
T⊂K⊂N
(−x′K)) > 0,
and choose K˜ which realizes the minimum of minT⊂K⊂N(−x′K). Build x∗ as follows:
x∗K =

−, if K = T
x′
K˜
+ , if K = K˜
x′K , otherwise.
We claim that x∗ ∈ In1 (v), which contradicts the hypothesis xT = 0 for all x ∈ In1 (v).
Indeed, it suffices to verify coalitional rationality:
(i) If K ⊇ K˜, we have φx∗(K) = φx′(K) ≥ v(K).
(ii) If K ⊇ T and K 6⊇ K˜, then
φx
∗(K) = φx′(K)−  ≥ φx′(K)− (φx′(K)− v(K)) = v(K).
(iii) If otherwise K ⊆ T , then φx∗(K) = φx′(K) ≥ v(K).
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